

Security and Stability Advisory Committee

Public Forum Presentation

Mar del Plata

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Steve Crocker, chair
steve@stevicrocker.com



Topics

- Structure
- Activities
- DNSSEC
- Domain Name Hijacking



Structure

- Committee of roughly 20 experts
 - All volunteers
 - All technical
 - Broad participation across component constituencies
- Board committee
 - Advised both the board and the overall community



Activities

- DNSSEC
- Domain Name Hijacking

- Add Storm
- Phishing
- etc



DNS Security



DNSSEC is...

- ... “DNS Security” Protocol
- ... protection against tampering
 - domain name and address are tied together
- ... an extension to the DNS protocol
- ... a twelve year technical development
- ... finally published by the IETF
 - RFCs 4033, 4034, 4035
- ... ready for deployment



DNSSEC Deployment is...

- ... the transition from specs to operation
- ... a multinational effort
- ... a complex process
- ... a project that needs your help



ICANN and DNSSEC

- ICANN
 - IANA signs the root
 - Coordination with the TLDs
 - Community Leadership
- Many other participants
 - Governments
 - ISPs, DNS operators
 - Enterprises
 - Software Vendors



What's Happening Now?

- Roadmap Development
- Workshops and Test Beds
- Software Development
- Early adopters
- Preparation for signing and deploying root
- Top level domains
- Selected applications



What's the Schedule?

- 2005
 - ✓ Specs published (RFCs 4033, 4034, 4035)
 - ✓ Road map
 - Root signing
 - Early TLD operation
 - Larger consortium
 - Luxembourg and Vancouver workshops
- 2006
 - Early applications
 - General availability of software
- 2007 ...



Domain Name Hijacking



Headlines

- Panix.com was hijacked on 15 Jan 2005
 - action returned it after 48 hours
- Gaining Registrar and Reseller at fault
- The problem is (also) systemic
- Other hijackings
 - hz.com is an equally compelling story
- Room for improvement



Tentative Recommendations

- Campaign for public awareness
 - Domain name risks and management of credentials
 - Domain name lock and auth-info mechanisms
 - Levels of service (contact hours, authentication techniques)
- Require Losing Registrar to send notification to the Registrant, in addition to Gaining registrar getting authorisation
 - Currently it's optional
 - Refinement of existing policy, not a reversal
- Development of emergency action channels
- Development of more visible enforcement
- Emergency "UnDo" procedure being pushed